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Paying What It Costs

Published on January 22, 2026

Paying What It Costs: Getting “5D” Work Done in a UBI World

Executive Summary

“5D” jobs – dull, dirty, dangerous, dear (high-stakes), and difficult – are essential but often low-paid and unsafe. Historically dubbed “3D” (dirty, dangerous, demeaning) work performed by society’s most vulnerable, these roles include sanitation, waste removal, mining, high-voltage line work, meatpacking, caregiving, and other essential services. Under current conditions, many 5D jobs rely on coercion by desperation: people take these jobs because they have no better choice, not because the compensation fairly reflects the risks and unpleasantness.
Universal Basic Income (UBI) ends coercion by desperation, raising workers’ reservation wage (the minimum pay they'd accept). With an income floor, workers gain the power to say no to exploitative wages and conditions. This forces employers (and governments) to pay true disamenity and hazard premiums for 5D work or improve conditions, instead of using poverty as leverage. In economic terms, UBI strengthens workers’ bargaining position in labor markets often characterized by monopsony power and weak compensating differentials.
Evidence shows that cash transfers do not make people stop working – they enable people to seek better work. Decades of studies on negative income tax experiments, modern basic income pilots, and Alaska’s dividend find little to no reduction in work effort overall. In some cases, UBI-like policies increase full-time employment by easing liquidity constraints and stress. The Stockton SEED trial, for example, saw basic income recipients move from 28% to 40% full-time employment in one year (versus a 5% increase for a control group). UBI reduces desperation-driven labor, but not meaningful labor.
Higher pay and better conditions do attract and retain workers in undesirable jobs – and improve safety. Empirical research shows that when genuinely needed, workers will do “dull, dirty, dangerous” work if it is made worth their while. During COVID-19, for instance, employers and cities that raised wages and offered safety protections saw improved staffing. Baltimore had to raise sanitation workers’ pay from $11 to $16/hour and add benefits to stop a trash collection crisis, immediately boosting attendance and retention. Conversely, labor markets that lean on “last resort” workers suffer high turnover and accident rates – e.g. home care agencies face ~60–80% annual turnover due to low pay, and temporary or subcontracted workers (who often fill 3D jobs) have significantly higher injury rates than permanent staff.
UBI will accelerate automation and job redesign where appropriate – a positive outcome. When low-wage labor is no longer cheaply available, firms have a choice: raise wages, invest in safer conditions, or replace the drudgery with technology. All of these responses can be socially beneficial. Economic studies confirm that higher labor costs (e.g. due to minimum wage hikes) spur firms to adopt labor-saving innovations, boosting productivity. In Japan and Europe, labor scarcity has already driven automation in sectors from manufacturing to retail. UBI “prices in” the true human cost of 5D jobs, nudging employers toward innovation instead of exploitation – for instance, more robotics in mining or sanitation – which ultimately reduces human exposure to danger and filth.
Policy implications: UBI is the foundation, but not the whole solution. We also need robust labor standards and public investment to ensure essential 5D services are staffed and safe. This means (1) enforcing strong workplace safety (OSHA) regulations with adequate inspections and penalties (the U.S. has only ~1 inspector per 80,000 workers today, far below international norms); (2) establishing hazard pay or wage floors for truly dangerous or vital jobs (as proposed in the COVID-19 “Heroes Fund” for frontline workers); (3) funding training/apprenticeships for high-skill difficult work (e.g. linemen, nurses) to enlarge the pool of qualified recruits; and (4) using government contracting and procurement to require fair wages and safety practices (no public dollars should subsidize poverty pay).
Bottom line: If society genuinely needs 5D work done, we must pay for it and protect it – not compel it through poverty. UBI flips the script: instead of asking “How do we make people do unpleasant work?”, we ask “What package of pay, respect, and safety will attract the people for whom this work is a good fit?” The result is a labor market that treats essential workers as essential, pricing these jobs like the costly, critical work they are. This transition not only upholds human dignity; it ensures that those performing society’s dirty and dangerous work are properly equipped, properly compensated, and there by choice – a recipe for better performance and fewer tragic outcomes.

Introduction: Essential Work Shouldn’t Rely on Desperation

“My friend asked: With a Universal Basic Income, who will still collect the garbage or work in the mines – especially before robots can do it?” It’s a fair question. After all, if everyone has a guaranteed income floor, won’t the nasty and dangerous jobs go unfilled? The answer flips the premise: If we truly need someone to do a job that is dull, dirty, dangerous, dear, or difficult – a “5D job” – then we as a society should pay what it really costs to ask a human being to do it. In other words, if it’s essential, it must be priced as essential. Universal Basic Income (UBI) doesn’t mean no one will do tough jobs; it means no one will be forced to do them for lack of options. Instead, employers and governments will have to make it worth it – through higher wages, better safety, smarter job design, and faster innovation.

This essay argues that a UBI in the United States would fundamentally change the labor market for 5D jobs by ending “coercion-by-desperation.” Today, many unpleasant jobs are done by people with few alternatives – often migrant workers, low-income minorities, or those with limited education. Wages for these jobs are kept low not because the work isn’t essential – society can’t function without trash collectors, caregivers, or meatpackers – but because workers are trapped. UBI removes the trap. Armed with an unconditional stipend, workers gain the freedom to refuse subpar jobs, raising their reservation wage (the minimum pay they require to take a job). This forces a reckoning: genuinely critical jobs will have to attract staff by reflecting their true “disamenity cost” in pay and protections, rather than by leaning on workers’ financial distress.

Crucially, UBI does not mean people stop working or contributing. Humans have a durable drive to work, achieve, and belong – when work is meaningful and fairly rewarded. What UBI changes is why people work. As we will see, evidence from UBI experiments shows little decline in work effort overall, but significant improvements in well-being and job choice. People work better when they aren’t forced by hunger; they work safer when they aren’t chronically stressed and distracted by financial scarcity. In high-risk and high-responsibility environments, having workers who want to be there – because the pay, conditions, and fit are right – is actually a safety imperative.

In the pages that follow, we will:

Define “5D jobs” and trace the concept’s origin in “3D” (dirty, dangerous, demeaning) work, with concrete U.S. examples.
Explain how UBI raises reservation wages and strengthens compensating wage differentials – compelling employers to pay hazard and drudgery premiums or improve job quality.
Review empirical evidence on how cash transfers (from 1970s negative income tax trials to the Alaska Permanent Fund to recent city pilots) affect labor supply, showing that basic income supports employment rather than negating it.
Present data on wages, turnover, and injury rates in unpleasant jobs, illustrating that better compensation and conditions do attract and retain workers – and that desperation-driven labor markets have hidden costs in accidents and inefficiency.
Discuss automation and innovation: how higher labor costs under UBI would expedite the development of labor-saving technologies (a positive long-run outcome, since the goal is to eliminate the worst 5D tasks entirely through innovation).
Outline complementary policies to ensure essential services remain staffed during the UBI transition – from stronger OSHA enforcement to hazard pay standards and training investments – so that public well-being is protected.
Anticipate common objections (“No one will do the dirty work,” “Wages will skyrocket into inflation,” “UBI just subsidizes laziness or employers,” “Robots will take all these jobs anyway”) and provide evidence-based rebuttals to each.

The core thesis is simple: UBI restores workers’ ability to say “If you need me to do that, this is what it’ll take.” In doing so, it forces us to confront the true cost of the vital yet undervalued labor that society has long taken for granted. If cleaning sewers or caring for elders or picking crops in 100-degree heat is work we rely on, then under UBI we must respect it in the only meaningful way: by paying a fair wage for the sacrifice, ensuring safe conditions, and never assuming someone will do it “or else starve.” The result will be fewer people doing such work (only those who choose to), paid more, with better tools – and a collective incentive to automate and improve these jobs as fast as possible.

UBI, in short, is a pathway to a labor market where every essential job is good enough to be someone’s choice. It is about replacing coercion with consent in the world of work. Let’s explore how and why that transformation is not only fair, but functional.

From 3D to 5D: What Are “Dull, Dirty, Dangerous, Dear, Difficult” Jobs?

The term “3D jobs” originated as shorthand for work that is dirty, dangerous, and demeaning (or demanding) – often filled by migrants or marginalized workers in industrialized countries. It’s a translation of a Japanese phrase (“3K”: kitanai, kiken, kitsui) that captured the same idea. In the mid-20th century West, “demeaning” was reframed as “dull” to emphasize monotony over social stigma. By the 2010s, analysts of automation like Brynjolfsson and McAfee had added a fourth “D,” “dear,” meaning expensive or high-stakes, to identify jobs that are costly if done by humans (either in wages or in consequence of error). In this essay we include a fifth: “difficult,” covering work that is physically or mentally arduous beyond the norm. Thus, “5D jobs” are those meeting one or more of these criteria:

Dull: Repetitive, monotonous tasks that provide little intrinsic engagement. Example: assembly line work with the same motion hundreds of times a day, data-entry or transcription work, routine surveillance monitoring. These jobs often see high turnover due to boredom and burnout.
Dirty: Work involving unsanitary or hazardous environmental exposure. Examples: garbage collection, sewage treatment, mining, oil drilling, industrial cleaning, meat and poultry processing. These jobs can pose health risks (pathogens, toxins) and are stigmatized by society – yet someone must do them to keep civilization running.
Dangerous: Roles with high risk of injury or death. Examples: Logging (which in 2022 had a fatality rate of 100.7 per 100,000 workers, the highest of any occupation), commercial fishing (50.9 per 100k), roofing (57.5 per 100k), electrical powerline work, construction, firefighting, and certain military or law enforcement duties. The U.S. saw 5,486 fatal work injuries in 2022 alone – disproportionately concentrated in these manual labor sectors (transportation, construction, extraction). Dangerous jobs should command a hazard pay premium in a free market, but in practice many do not (we explore this below).
Dear (High-Stakes/Expensive): Jobs where human error can be extremely costly or where high skill is required, making labor expensive. Examples: Airline pilots and air traffic controllers (lives at stake with every decision), surgeons and anesthesiologists, nuclear power technicians, financial traders managing billions. These roles may already be well-paid due to their skill barriers, but UBI highlights that if society needs someone to take on huge responsibility or risk, that too must be incentivized. “Dear” can also refer to roles that are simply very costly to fill because they require extensive training (e.g. pipeline welders on remote sites, or cybersecurity experts protecting critical infrastructure).
Difficult: This overlaps with the above but denotes work that is exceptionally taxing physically or mentally. Examples: Coal mining in cramped conditions, seasonal agricultural labor in extreme weather, caring for multiple high-need patients in understaffed nursing homes, or jobs requiring intense focus for long periods. Difficulty can come from strenuous manual effort, complex problem-solving under pressure, or emotional strain (consider an ICU nurse during a pandemic).

These categories often overlap in a single occupation. A meatpacking worker faces “dirty” (blood, offal, pathogen exposure), “dangerous” (high injury rates from cutting tools and repetitive strain), and “difficult” (cold, fast-paced, psychologically distressing) conditions – yet the median wage for slaughterhouse workers is around $15 per hour. A high-voltage line technician encounters dangerous and difficult conditions (heights, live electricity, storms) and performs a high-stakes (“dear”) service keeping our grid running – yet utilities have sometimes struggled to fill these roles as an aging workforce retires, in part because the perceived rewards don’t match the risks and training required.

Why are many 5D jobs paid so modestly despite their obvious importance? In theory, labor markets should compensate workers for job disamenities through compensating wage differentials. That is, a risky or unpleasant job must offer higher pay to attract workers, all else equal. In practice, however, these differentials are often suppressed by power imbalances and labor market frictions. When workers have little choice – due to poverty, lack of mobility, or employer monopsony – they accept jobs at wages far below what would be “danger pay” in a truly competitive market. Migrant workers, for example, frequently end up in 3D jobs at low wages because their alternatives are worse and they lack bargaining power. A classic image is the immigrant day laborer risking life and limb on a construction site for minimum wage, or the single mother working overnight in a dangerous warehouse because she can’t afford to say no.

UBI directly changes this equation. By guaranteeing a basic income sufficient to meet basic needs, it ensures that no one is forced by sheer survival necessity to take a 5D job at inadequate pay. People can hold out for better offers or seek different work without literal starvation looming. This doesn’t mean 5D jobs go away – society’s need for them doesn’t vanish – but it means these jobs must rise to meet a higher bar of attractiveness. In practical terms: wages must rise, conditions must improve, or both.

Before examining the economics of that shift in detail, it’s worth noting a key sociological point: Some individuals will still choose 5D jobs under the right circumstances. People are diverse in their preferences and tolerance. There are those who crave physical challenges or monotony (finding zen in repetitive tasks), those who take pride in doing essential gritty work, or those fascinated by high-risk, adrenaline-rich careers. A UBI doesn’t extinguish the human desire to contribute – it channels it. When work is voluntary, the people who step forward tend to be the ones best suited and internally motivated for it, especially if the pay premium is significant. UBI, by raising the floor, effectively says: “If this job is as awful or risky as it seems, you’d better offer a lot more than the basic stipend to get takers – but if you do, you’ll get people who actively accept the trade-off.” In a sense, 5D work can transform from being the refuge of the desperate to being a high-premium vocation for a self-selected group of professionals who say, “Yes, I’ll do that, but you must compensate me properly and give me the tools to do it safely.”

UBI and the End of Coerced Labor: Economic Mechanisms

From an economic perspective, a Universal Basic Income creates a floor for workers’ income that increases their reservation wage. The reservation wage is the lowest wage at which a person is willing to work. If a worker can meet basic needs through UBI (or other income support), their reservation wage for taking on an unpleasant job will be higher – they now require a meaningful premium to justify doing that job instead of not working or pursuing other opportunities. UBI thus acts as a form of strike fund for everyone: it doesn’t make work optional, but it makes undesirable work optional unless sweetened.

This increased worker leverage corrects a market distortion in many low-wage sectors. In a well-functioning competitive market with full information, we would expect compensating wage differentials to make dangerous or unpleasant jobs pay more than safer, cleaner jobs requiring similar skill. As Adam Smith noted in The Wealth of Nations (1776), to induce someone to undertake hazardous work (like a soldier or coal miner), you must offer “honour, profit, or privilege.” However, empirical research finds that in reality, compensating differentials are often weak or absent for the most vulnerable workers. For instance, non-union and low-wage workers get little or no hazard pay premium, whereas unionized workers do see extra compensation for risk. A meta-analysis by W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph Aldy found that in 9 out of 10 studies they reviewed, unionized workers enjoyed significantly higher risk premiums than similar non-union workers, and several studies even found non-union workers in risky jobs earned lower wages than their safer counterparts – a perverse outcome explained by lack of bargaining power. Similarly, Black and immigrant workers, who disproportionately work in dangerous industries, receive smaller risk premiums than white native-born workers, controlling for job type. In one study, Black workers’ wage gain for a unit of fatal risk was only ~60% of what white workers received, compounding racial pay inequities. These findings underscore that labor market outcomes are not purely driven by “free choice” – they’re shaped by power imbalances and alternatives (or lack thereof). Desperate workers accept dangerous, disagreeable jobs for low pay, so that’s what those jobs pay.

By guaranteeing an alternative means of subsistence, UBI removes desperation from the equation. It effectively enforces what economist Peter Dorman calls a shift from a “Lochner era” freedom-of-contract labor market (where employers could assume workers will take whatever is offered) to a more balanced bargaining scenario. Employers, unable to count on a queue of people who must accept any wage, will have to reassess how much compensation is needed to staff a given job. If a poultry plant currently pays $12/hr with a high injury rate and high turnover, post-UBI it may find no takers at $12 because workers now have a fallback. To attract staff, maybe it must pay $18/hr plus provide better safety gear and more breaks – essentially internalizing the health/safety costs into wages, rather than externalizing them onto workers’ bodies. If that makes the business unprofitable, it signals that the job was being done unsustainably cheap by offloading costs onto vulnerable workers.

It’s important to note this doesn’t mean every unpleasant job’s wage will skyrocket arbitrarily. In some cases, employers will find ways to make the job less unpleasant (mechanize certain tasks, improve ergonomics, rotate duties to reduce monotony) such that a modest wage hike suffices. In other cases, the job might be restructured into fewer positions that are higher-paid and more skilled. And in cases where society truly needs the service (say, garbage collection or elder care), there will be willingness to pay more via higher service fees or public funding to meet the market-clearing wage. The key is, UBI forces a true market test of how essential a job is. If no one will do it for a given wage once basic needs are met otherwise, that wage was being held artificially low by poverty. The new equilibrium will reflect the real price of labor for that function.

Human Motivation, Matching, and Safety in the 5D Workplace

UBI not only changes the financial calculus; it changes the human factor in these jobs. When work is freely chosen rather than forced, the workforce self-selects in a way that can improve overall outcomes – including safety and productivity.

Decades of work motivation research (notably Self-Determination Theory) have established that autonomy, competence, and relatedness are core psychological needs that drive motivation and well-being in any activity. In plainer terms: people perform best when they choose what they’re doing, feel capable at it, and find meaning or camaraderie in it. UBI moves 5D jobs in this direction by ensuring that the people doing them are there because they decide to be (autonomy) and presumably because the job offers rewards that align with their goals (competence/mastery or financial improvement). A universal basic income doesn’t make people stop contributing; it changes why they contribute. The difference between a coal miner working 12-hour shifts because otherwise his kids won’t eat, versus a coal miner working 12-hour shifts because it’s a challenging job that now pays a solid middle-class salary and he takes pride in powering the nation, is night and day – for the worker’s mindset and for the employer’s outcomes.

When survival is on the line, work becomes mere compliance. The worker is physically present but may be mentally disengaged, resentful, or anxious. When survival is secured, work becomes a choice – and that distinction matters most for the jobs we least want done by people who hate being there. In high-risk or high-stakes roles, having workers who are internally motivated and not chronically stressed is not just a nicety; it’s a safety issue. Numerous studies have found that financial scarcity and stress can impair cognitive function, attention, and decision-making. A famous experiment by behavioral scientists showed that worrying about money can temporarily reduce IQ by 13 points – equivalent to missing an entire night’s sleep. In a dangerous job, a lapse in attention or judgment can be fatal. Thus, desperation isn’t just bad for the worker; it’s dangerous for the task at hand. A forklift driver who is sleep-deprived from working a second job or mentally preoccupied by eviction risk is far more likely to make a mistake than one who is secure and rested.

Real-world data back this up: Workplaces with a high proportion of precarious, temp, or insecure workers see higher accident rates. Research published in 2024 found that Canadian workers in “very high precarious” employment (e.g. temp contracts, low wages, no benefits) had nearly triple the rate of workplace injury claims compared to those in stable employment. Even after controlling for the inherent hazards of industries, precarity itself acted like an independent risk factor – akin to an “occupational hazard” in its own right. In the U.S., the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) reports that temporary workers have higher injury rates than permanent workers in similar roles. They also often receive less training and are reluctant to speak up about safety issues due to job insecurity. “Last-resort labor” is not a stable staffing model for essential work – it leads to corners cut, higher turnover (meaning less experienced workers on the job), and a culture of just scraping by.

UBI tackles this by removing the “last resort” status of these jobs. Employers would have to attract workers who voluntarily enter the high-risk or undesirable role because the compensation and conditions are appealing enough. Those who do enter will, on average, be better suited and more engaged – the person who says “I’ll do dirty job X for $25 an hour” is likely more prepared for it than someone who does it grudgingly for $12 because of desperation. And because they can leave anytime (they won’t starve), they have leverage to insist on safe practices and respectful treatment – or they’ll walk. This incentivizes employers to invest in safety and training to retain these workers. It’s notable that unionized workplaces, which give workers more security and voice, also have stronger safety outcomes in many cases (and union workers demand either safety improvements or hazard pay). UBI could provide a kind of baseline “individual unionization” – each worker knows they won’t be destitute if they quit, so dangerous conditions become less tolerable and more contestable.

In sum, UBI improves 5D work not only by raising pay, but by changing the selection and psychology of who does the work. It moves the equilibrium from “who can we get who can’t say no?” to “who is willing to say yes, given our offer?”. The workers who show up under the new regime are more likely to be suited, trained, and mentally present, and less likely to be there out of fear or distraction. They will also be in a position to demand and negotiate for ongoing improvements. This dynamic – more voluntary, professionalized essential work – means safer outcomes for all. An oft-heard concern is “but what if nobody takes the job?” UBI reveals that if truly nobody will do a critical job even at higher pay and better conditions, then we either need to dramatically rethink that job (break it into different tasks, heavily automate it, etc.) or compel it through non-market means (which liberal democracies are loath to do outside of military drafts or jury duty). In reality, there is little evidence that crucial jobs have zero willing takers at higher pay. It’s simply that we haven’t been paying many of them enough to find the willing takers.

To illustrate, consider the often-cited example of sanitation work (trash collection). It’s dirty and can be dangerous (lifting injuries, traffic accidents). Many U.S. cities pay sanitation workers relatively modest wages; historically, these jobs were filled reliably because they were union-protected or had decent benefits for those without college education. In recent years, however, some cities struggled to hire and retain trash collectors as private contractors squeezed wages. The result was predictable: labor shortages and service backlogs. In 2020, Baltimore experienced a garbage pile-up during the pandemic until the city upped sanitation workers’ pay from $11 to $16/hour and offered bonuses, converting many temp positions to full-time. Workers who had quit or were doing the bare minimum started “showing up for work” with improved morale, and trash pickup returned to schedule. Essentially, the city was forced to acknowledge the true cost of keeping the city clean, and once it did, the people willing to do the work emerged. UBI would make this the norm across all sectors: you either pay and treat the workers well enough to attract voluntary participation, or the job goes unfilled (in which case perhaps it should).

Let us now back these arguments with evidence, starting with how UBI and cash transfers have affected work patterns in empirical studies.

Evidence: Cash Transfers, Basic Income, and Labor Supply

A fear often voiced is that if people receive a basic income without conditions, they will stop working entirely – becoming lazy or dependent. This “lotus-eaters” hypothesis has been tested in various forms for over half a century, and the data simply do not support it (especially not for prime working-age adults). Instead, research consistently finds minor to moderate reductions in labor supply in response to cash transfers – mostly in the form of people working a bit less overtime, changing jobs, or spending more time on education or caregiving, rather than dropping out altogether. Moreover, the qualitative effects often include people moving to better jobs or improving their well-being. Let’s review key findings from high-quality studies:

Negative Income Tax (NIT) Experiments (USA, 1968–1980s): In the late 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. federal government ran four major randomized trials providing a form of guaranteed income (an NIT) to thousands of families (in New Jersey/Pennsylvania, Iowa, Seattle/Denver, and Gary, IN). These experiments were the closest the U.S. came to testing a basic income until very recently. The consensus analysis of these trials found only modest work reductions. A comprehensive review by economist Philip Robins concluded that on average, husbands reduced labor supply by about 2 weeks per year, wives by 3 weeks, and single mothers by 3 weeks (out of 52). There was no “massive exit” from the workforce – the majority of primary earners continued working full-time. Instead, the reduction in hours tended to manifest as longer job search between jobs or more time spent on home responsibilities. Notably, some participants used the cushion to go back to school or get training, or to hold out for a better-paying job – behavior that can increase productivity long-term (though the short experiment horizons didn’t fully capture long-run gains in earnings). In short, the NIT experiments showed that a guaranteed income led to a slight decrease in work hours, concentrated among second earners and young people (teens stayed in school slightly longer, mothers spent more time with young children), but did not erode the work ethic of most participants. As one analysis put it, “most of the men do not respond at all” – those who reduced hours were a minority who made rational choices like taking a bit longer to find a suitable job.
Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (since 1982): Alaska has had what amounts to a small UBI for four decades – an annual dividend paid to every resident, financed by oil revenues. The payment varies but has averaged around $1,000–$2,000 per person. Economists have treated this as a natural experiment in unconditional cash. A recent study by Jones and Marinescu (2022) found that the Alaska dividend had no significant effect on overall employment rates. In fact, their analysis of CPS data showed that while some people worked slightly fewer hours, there was an offsetting increase in part-time work; overall labor force participation was unchanged or even slightly up. One reason is that the cash stimulated demand in local economies, creating some jobs (a “multiplier effect”) that offset any labor supply reduction. The authors conclude that a universal, permanent cash transfer of that scale “does not significantly decrease aggregate employment”. Critics might note the dividend is relatively small (often under 5% of median income), but it disproves the notion that even a no-strings stipend makes people quit working en masse. Notably, Alaska has no trouble staffing fishing boats, oil fields, or other tough jobs – they just have to pay well, as they generally do (North Slope oil jobs, for example, are high-paying and still attract workers even though every Alaskan gets the basic dividend).
Eastern Cherokee Casino Dividend (since 1997): Another instructive case is the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in North Carolina, who since the late 1990s have shared profits from a tribal casino as biannual cash payouts to all members (amounting to several thousand dollars per year). Studies by economists including Randall Akee have examined outcomes here. Like Alaska, the findings show no reduction in employment – if anything, some improved educational and social outcomes for kids who grew up with the extra income. Crime rates fell and high school graduation rates rose among Cherokee youth after the dividend began, indicating better long-run prospects. Adults did not exit the labor force; many used the income to stabilize their lives (pay off debt, start small businesses, etc.). This real-world example again shows that broadly distributed cash doesn’t hollow out a community’s work ethic – it improves quality of life and future opportunities.
Finland Basic Income Experiment (2017–2018): Finland conducted a national pilot where 2,000 unemployed people were given a guaranteed €560 per month (about $635) with no conditions, for two years. The results, released in 2020, found small but positive employment effects – the basic income recipients had slightly more days of work on average than the control group by the second year – but the difference was not large or statistically strong, in part due to a contemporaneous policy change in unemployment benefits for the control group. Importantly, the basic income group reported significantly better well-being: less stress, less depression, and higher trust in society. They also felt more confident in their ability to influence their lives. In other words, even with only modest employment gains, the basic income clearly improved people’s mental health and outlook – which, as argued above, likely makes them better workers when they do work. The Finnish trial participants often said that the basic income made them feel freer to take short-term gigs or start a business, since they didn’t fear losing a safety net. This highlights another mechanism: UBI can encourage risk-taking and entrepreneurship, which are work activities of a sort, even if not a 9-to-5 job.
Stockton SEED (2019–2020, California): The Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration gave $500/month to 125 randomly selected residents of a low-income neighborhood, for 24 months. Results from the first year showed remarkable outcomes: the basic income more than doubled the rate of full-time employment among recipients, from 28% to 40%, while the control group of similar people only rose from 32% to 37%. Recipients were more likely to find jobs – debunking the myth that free money makes people stop looking. How? Many participants used the money to afford transportation, clothes, or time for job interviews, or to take night classes. One man had been working part-time at a warehouse; with the $500, he was able to pay for a certificate course and land a full-time job in a better field. Recipients also reported less anxiety and depression and improved physical health. The vast majority of the money was spent on basic needs like food, utilities, and car repairs, not on temptation goods. In short, Stockton demonstrated that a modest guaranteed income can increase work by providing stability and liquidity. People weren’t quitting jobs; they were getting jobs with the help of the cash.
Other Guaranteed Income Pilots: Dozens of smaller pilots (in U.S. cities like Jackson, Mississippi; Denver, Colorado; New York; and abroad in Canada, Brazil, Kenya, etc.) broadly echo these findings. The general pattern is: no large exodus from work, some reductions in work hours mainly among caregivers or students, sometimes improvements in employment or earnings, and consistently better health and mental health outcomes for recipients. For instance, a meta-study of cash transfer programs worldwide by the World Bank (2018) found virtually no cases of significant work disincentives – most programs showed either no change or an increase in work effort, especially in terms of starting small businesses or farming productivity.

Pulling back, what do these results tell us about UBI and 5D jobs? First, they undermine the scare scenario that “no one will work” – clearly people do. Even with a basic income, most adults want more than subsistence and want to be productive. They may, however, become choosier about which jobs to take. And that’s precisely the point: people will not accept bad jobs if they don’t absolutely have to. This is a feature, not a bug, of UBI from the perspective of improving job quality. Society does not suffer when a person turns down a rock-bottom wage at an unsafe workplace; society suffers when that unsafe workplace continues operating by exploiting workers. With UBI, labor supply becomes more elastic to job conditions – workers might delay taking a job or hold out for one that is safer or better suited. We saw a taste of this in 2021 when pandemic stimulus and expanded unemployment benefits coincided with many low-wage employers having to raise pay to lure workers back. Critics called it a “labor shortage,” but in reality it was a wage shortage – once wages rose, positions filled. UBI would create a permanent version of that dynamic, but with more forethought and less chaos, as both workers and firms adjust to the new baseline.

It’s worth noting that UBI might particularly encourage people to leave the most demeaning or ill-fitting jobs. For example, someone who hates tedious factory work might use UBI to pursue training in a different field. In the short run, that looks like a labor supply reduction in “dull” jobs. But in the long run, it’s beneficial because only those who don’t mind factory work (or are compensated enough to tolerate it) will remain, and others move into roles where they’re happier and likely more productive. Economists call this occupational matching efficiency. UBI essentially subsidizes a better matching of talents to tasks by removing the fear that prevents workers from switching or retraining.

In sum, empirical evidence strongly suggests that a UBI would not empty out the 5D workforce; it would prune it of the most unwilling participants. The remaining labor force for these jobs would be smaller, yes – as it should be, because today many are there under duress – but those who remain would do so under improved terms, and many others would shift to other areas where they can contribute (often still working!). Society can then decide how to cope with fewer people eager to do dirty or dangerous work: through higher wages (attracting some back), through innovation (reducing the need for people in those jobs), or through prioritizing what truly needs human labor versus what can be reduced or delayed. That decision point is precisely what we explore next: raising wages and improving job quality for 5D work, and what evidence says about the effects of doing so.

Evidence: Wages, Benefits, and Better Conditions Attract (and Keep) Workers – and Save Lives

If UBI compels employers to raise wages and improve conditions for 5D jobs, will it actually succeed in drawing enough labor to these fields? The laws of supply and demand, and a lot of real-world data, say yes: offer a high enough premium and sufficient protections, and people will do tough jobs. The U.S. military, for instance, recruits for extremely dangerous and austere roles by offering compensation packages (salary, health care, education benefits, pensions) that, while not lavish, are well above what a young adult with a high school diploma could get in the civilian market. Likewise, occupations like commercial fishing or oil drilling, which are quite hazardous, often pay significantly above average wages (e.g. oil rig workers can earn six-figure incomes). People flock to these opportunities despite the risks, because the reward is clear.

The problem in many domestic 5D jobs is that the reward has not been clear – often due to corporate cost-cutting, weak labor laws, or an exploitative labor pool (such as undocumented immigrants or prison labor). UBI will force the correction. History gives us plenty of smaller-scale examples of how adding pay or improving conditions can resolve labor shortfalls or safety issues:

Hazard Pay During COVID-19: In the early phase of the COVID pandemic, many frontline jobs suddenly became much riskier (due to virus exposure). Some major employers instituted temporary “hazard pay” bonuses – for example, grocery chains like Kroger and Amazon added $2/hour to front-line workers in 2020 (though many cut it after a few months). Where hazard pay persisted, companies found it helped with morale and retention as workers felt recognized for the risk. When hazard pay was cut, there were strikes and increased quits. One Brookings analysis argued that a federal hazard pay (the proposed “Heroes Fund” of $13/hour extra for essential workers) would not only be just but also help maintain staffing of critical services. This was essentially an acknowledgment that yes, if the job suddenly includes a serious new danger, you must increase pay. Congress ultimately did not pass the broad hazard pay, and many employers stopped their bonuses even while the pandemic raged – and indeed, grocery and health care sectors saw higher attrition and even job actions as a result. The lesson: pay matters for retaining people when jobs become more dangerous.
Union Wage Premiums and Undesirable Jobs: Unions have long negotiated higher pay for unpleasant or risky work. For instance, unionized construction laborers and miners typically earn more than their non-union counterparts and have better safety training, which helps keep those industries staffed despite inherent dangers. The union effect on compensating differentials is well-documented: union members are more likely to actually receive hazard pay if conditions warrant, whereas non-union workers often do not. One study found that union coal miners had significantly higher wages and lower fatality rates than non-union miners – essentially, unions forced companies to internalize some of the risk costs either by paying more or investing in safety. UBI would function as a kind of universal, individualized union, giving every worker the fall-back option that strengthens their hand in demanding fair pay for foul work.
Turnover and Job Quality: High turnover is a clear sign that a job is under-compensated relative to its unpleasantness. Many 5D sectors today have extremely high turnover, which is costly and dangerous. For example, as mentioned, the annual turnover among home health aides and nursing home caregivers is estimated between 40% and 80%. These are difficult jobs (physically demanding, emotionally draining, often with irregular hours) and are notoriously low-paid (often near minimum wage with no benefits). Not coincidentally, these sectors face chronic shortages – a situation poised to worsen as America’s population ages. Studies find that even modest wage increases can significantly reduce caregiver turnover. One analysis by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that a $1 increase in the hourly wage of nursing assistants reduced annual quit rates by a substantial margin, improving continuity of care (which in turn improves patient outcomes). Similarly, when English hospital nurses got a pay raise in the 2000s, retention improved markedly in hard-to-staff shifts, benefiting patient safety. We can glean a simple truth: people are more likely to stay in a hard job if it pays enough to make a decent life and if they feel valued. UBI would force the baseline pay up to where that condition holds, or else those jobs simply won’t keep workers and will have to change.
Case Study – Baltimore Sanitation (Revisited): We already discussed how Baltimore had to raise pay to $16/hour for garbage collectors to stop them from quitting en masse during COVID. After the raise and new full-time hires, city officials reported improved garbage pickup rates and fewer complaints. A city councilor noted that when workers were “severely underpaid” (temporary workers at $11/hr with no benefits), the city was “feeling the effects” in the form of trash piling up. Once pay was boosted, “workers are going to stick around longer” and “perform at a high level,” he said. This demonstrates in microcosm what we expect at scale: pay people enough, and essential dirty work will get done – with better morale and reliability.
Compensating Differentials in Risk: Going back to theory, there’s an implied numerical value people place on risk – often called the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) – derived from wage premiums. In the U.S., regulatory agencies assume a VSL around $10 million (based on studies of how much extra pay workers require, on average, for a job with a 1-in-10,000 annual fatality risk). But as we saw, not everyone actually gets that premium. With UBI, more workers would insist on it, or refuse the risk. If employers had to truly pay, say, an extra $1 per hour for every per-10k risk of death on the job (a rough translation of VSL), dangerous industries would either become much higher-wage or would invest heavily in reducing risks to save money. Many would do both. This is essentially what happened in the unionized sectors in the 20th century: auto manufacturing, for instance, raised wages and also invested in safety guards and procedures when workers pushed via unions and OSHA regulations. The result was dramatic – workplace fatality rates dropped by 80% between 1970 and today, even as wages rose for a time. We can thank worker power and regulation for that improvement. UBI would reinforce these gains at the low end of the labor market that still remains perilous (like agriculture, which has the highest death rate of any U.S. industry, 18.4 per 100k).
Precarious Work and Safety: As discussed, temporary and contract workers often suffer higher accident and injury rates. One reason is they are less trained and familiar; another is they may be reluctant to speak up or refuse unsafe tasks for fear of losing the job. With UBI, the hope is that all work becomes less precarious because no worker is 100% dependent on pleasing a boss to survive. This should empower even temp workers to say “I won’t do that without proper training or gear,” improving safety. It could also push employers to prefer more stable employment relationships since the old model of churning through temps willing to take risks might no longer be viable if those people have a UBI alternative.

In summary, raising wages and improving job quality works to attract labor – the evidence is abundant. The only reason it sometimes “doesn’t work” is if an employer tries half-measures (like a tiny raise) that don’t actually meet workers’ reservation wages or address key issues. Under UBI, employers wouldn’t be able to get away with half-measures for critical roles; the market pressure would be intense to get it right. Some wages absolutely should rise, and some low-end business models that depend on ultra-cheap labor would shrink or disappear (which, one can argue, is an efficient outcome – if your business can only exist by paying people poverty wages for dangerous work, is it truly a net benefit to society?).

One can ask: would raising all these wages cause problematic inflation? We’ll address that concern in the counterarguments section, but note here that it’s largely about relative price changes. Yes, the cost of services like waste collection, food, and caregiving might go up somewhat when workers are paid more. But these reflect a necessary rebalancing – a shift of income from perhaps low consumer prices (achieved via exploitation) toward the workers themselves. Moreover, some of the increased labor cost can be offset by productivity gains (if higher pay results in lower turnover and more skilled, efficient work, as often happens). There is also an offset in the form of reduced spending on emergency healthcare, welfare, etc., for impoverished workers. In economic terms, what UBI and higher wages do is make the implicit subsidies explicit: instead of society “saving money” by underpaying firefighters or meatpackers and then dealing with high injury costs and welfare needs, it pays them upfront properly, and maybe the price of a burger goes up a few cents – but the workers can actually live decently.

Now, beyond wages, another critical aspect is automation – the other path employers can take instead of or in addition to raising pay. Let’s explore that angle.

Automation: Pricing in Human Costs, Accelerating Innovation

A common rejoinder to the idea of raising pay for 5D jobs is, “Won’t companies just automate those jobs instead?” This is usually said as if it’s a bad thing. But from a societal perspective, automating dull, dirty, and dangerous tasks is precisely what we want! The only reason to lament automation would be if it causes mass unemployment without support – but with UBI in place, workers have a cushion to transition. In fact, one of the philosophical arguments for UBI is to facilitate a smooth adaption to automation in the economy.

Higher labor costs and labor scarcity have historically been key drivers of technological innovation. When labor is cheap and abundant, businesses have little incentive to invest in new machines or processes. When labor becomes expensive or scarce, necessity begets invention. One famous historical example: after the Black Death in medieval Europe drastically reduced the workforce, real wages rose; in the aftermath, there was a burst of labor-saving innovations (some historians tie the printing press, better mill technology, etc., to this period of high wages). More recently, economists Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo have documented that countries (or U.S. regions) with higher wage levels or tighter labor markets adopt robots and automation faster than those with cheap labor. For instance, Japan’s aging population and low immigration (hence labor scarcity) has made it a world leader in robotics – from automated train stations to robot caregivers – whereas countries with younger, cheaper workforces don’t automate as much because human labor is readily available.

Empirical research backs this up in the context of wage policy. A 2025 study in Nature by Sharfaei and Thavorn looked at European countries that raised minimum wages and found that minimum wage hikes were associated with an increase in industrial robot installations. Firms responded to higher wage floors by accelerating automation, which in turn increased productivity without reducing the share of income going to labor overall (the labor share held steady or even rose slightly due to higher productivity and wages for the remaining workers). Another analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2024) used text mining of corporate earnings calls and found that when CEOs talked about labor shortages or rising wage costs, many also discussed investments in automation to “address wage inflation and improve efficiencies”. The researchers quantified that firms facing labor tightness boosted their capital investments (including automation tech) significantly, especially in industries with lots of routine manual tasks. In plain terms, when it got harder to hire cheap workers, companies spent more on machines. They gave an example quote from an automotive tech executive: “Our focus this year is on accelerating automation to address wage inflation and improve efficiencies in our plants.” This encapsulates what we expect under UBI: if wages in a sector go up, the incentive to automate mundane or hazardous parts of that work also goes up. This is a feature, not a bug.

We should acknowledge that automation can eliminate certain jobs. But historically, technology also creates new ones and raises productivity (which can translate into higher living standards, shorter work weeks, etc., if managed well). The transition can be painful if workers aren’t protected – which is why pairing automation with UBI is so powerful. UBI provides that protection. If a robot replaces a human in a 5D job, the human doesn’t lose their livelihood; they still have basic income and can retrain or move to a different field at their own pace. Meanwhile, society has one less person cleaning sewers or risking mining accidents – a net win for humanity if we can reallocate that labor to better uses.

Let’s consider some likely automation trajectories in a UBI world:

Dull Jobs: These are often the easiest to automate. Repetitive tasks (data entry, basic manufacturing assembly, supermarket checkouts) are exactly what AI and robots excel at. We already see self-checkout kiosks reducing the need for cashiers, and basic algorithms handling clerical processing. If UBI raises the effective cost of hiring humans for dull jobs, companies will more rapidly deploy these technologies. This doesn’t mean mass unemployment of cashiers – many will move into customer service roles or other positions, while others might leave retail for jobs they prefer. Importantly, productivity gains from automation in a UBI scenario can be shared more broadly (since people have the UBI and presumably we could tax some of the higher profits from automation to fund it). Automation of dull work should be celebrated – it frees humans from tedium. UBI just ensures those humans aren’t punished for that freedom.
Dirty and Dangerous Jobs: These often have been automated slowly because, ironically, human life has been “cheap” from a cost perspective. For example, automated waste-sorting or sewer-inspecting robots exist but haven’t been universally adopted because employing manual crews is still cost-competitive. If labor for those jobs costs more (due to needing a risk premium), the balance tips toward machines. Mining offers a case study: In Australia, some large mines moved to autonomous haul trucks and remote-operated drilling equipment not purely to save money, but also because it improved safety and because attracting workers to remote mines was difficult without very high wages. With UBI, if miners demand even higher pay to compensate for danger, mining firms will intensify efforts toward fully robotic mines (several companies are already on that path). That means fewer mining jobs – which is fine if those were dangerous jobs to begin with – and more jobs in maintaining robots, software, etc., which are safer. Another example: meatpacking is a dirty, injury-prone job with relatively low pay; as labor got scarcer in 2021, companies started investing in more automation (like robotic butchery for some cuts). Those machines are expensive now, but their cost will drop with scale. A UBI-induced wage increase could be the push that makes it cost-effective to automate, sparing humans some of the most gruesome factory work.
High-Stakes “Dear” Jobs: Some of these, like air traffic control or firefighting, cannot be fully automated yet (and we wouldn’t want to until AI is extremely reliable). However, making these jobs more attractive via pay could actually increase the talent pool and performance in the interim. Automation here might take the form of advanced decision-support systems, drones to assist, etc., rather than replacing humans entirely. The key is that UBI would not lead to no one doing these jobs – because they are mission-critical and society will allocate the needed resources (through government salaries, etc.) to ensure they are done. We already see this logic in volunteer militaries: to fill ranks, pay bonuses and benefits are offered. In a UBI world, those bonuses might have to be bigger, or perhaps a draft would be considered if not enough soldiers – but realistically, if the nation’s security is at stake, public willingness to pay goes up. The same applies to other essential high-skill jobs.
Care Work (Difficult in emotional terms): Automation in caregiving (eldercare, childcare) is tricky because human touch is part of the service. However, if care workers demand higher wages (which they absolutely should, given how draining the work is), one result might be increased investment in labor-saving devices (like patient-lifting equipment, automated medication dispensers, etc.) to boost productivity per caregiver, and perhaps more use of assistive AI (monitoring systems) so that one caregiver can safely oversee more patients. This could alleviate worker shortages while making the job less back-breaking, meaning you can pay a good wage and still afford it because each worker can do more with tech assist. UBI would in parallel allow some family members to reduce paid work to provide care (since they have basic income), partially offsetting demand for formal care workers. That is not “bad” either – it means people have more choice to care for loved ones.

One interesting macroeconomic effect: UBI would serve as an automatic stabilizer in the face of automation-driven productivity growth. If automation in some sectors really takes off (say trucking gets automated, displacing many drivers), UBI ensures those ex-drivers still have spending power, which sustains demand for new jobs in other areas (e.g., services, creative industries, green energy). This helps prevent the economy from falling into a shortfall of consumption that could otherwise occur if too many people lost jobs with no income. It’s a kind of built-in Keynesian stabilizer for the automation age, as Andrew Yang and others have argued.

We should also address the long-term vision: hopefully, over generations, many 5D jobs get either automated away or so improved that they’re not really “bad” jobs anymore. UBI is a bridge to that future. It reduces the human cost during the transition and hastens the transition where it’s being artificially delayed by exploitative equilibrium.

There is, however, a need for policy management of automation’s impacts – ensuring training and re-skilling are available, for instance, and that the gains from automation (higher productivity) translate into societal gains (could be shorter work weeks, could be more social services, etc., not just higher corporate profits). UBI helps by directly distributing some gains (if funded by broad-based taxes, including on capital income, it recirculates wealth).

In sum, yes, UBI will likely cause a faster uptake of automation for many 5D tasks, and this is a feature. As one World Economic Forum article pointedly asked, “If AI takes all the jobs, who will buy anything?” – implying UBI might be necessary to support consumption. Our view flips it: if AI takes the bad jobs, who cares? UBI is there to ensure those workers land on their feet and can find or create new, better work. We do need a policy framework to guide this, which leads to the next section – what policies, beyond UBI, make this a smooth and fair process.

Policy Design: Ensuring Essential Services and a Fair Transition

UBI lays the groundwork by empowering workers, but a successful transition to a UBI world – especially for essential 5D services – will require smart policies and public investment. Here are key complementary measures and how they tie into the 5D jobs question:

Strengthen Labor Standards and Enforcement (OSHA, Wage Laws): With UBI raising workers’ expectations, we must ensure employers cannot circumvent those expectations by skimping on safety or cheating on wages. A robust Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) with ample inspectors and penalties is critical. Today, OSHA is under-resourced: with roughly 2,200 inspectors covering 130 million workers, that’s about 1 inspector per 59,000 workers at the state level (and 1 per 80k federally) – far from the International Labor Organization benchmark of 1 per 10,000. UBI or not, we need more enforcement. Post-UBI, one could imagine some employers trying to cut corners if workers demand higher pay – e.g. hiring informal labor at below standard wages or neglecting safety to save cost. Strong enforcement will level the playing field so that good employers (who pay and protect) are not undercut by bad actors. Heavier fines and even criminal liability for willful endangerment of workers could be on the table. Essentially, the government must back up workers’ refusal to accept unsafe, underpaid work by legally prohibiting such work conditions from being offered. This includes tackling misclassification (bosses labeling employees as “contractors” to avoid standards) – something UBI doesn’t solve by itself but labor law can.
Wage Floors and Hazard Pay Requirements: UBI doesn’t eliminate the need for minimum wage laws or supplemental hazard pay mandates; in fact it may enable even higher standards. Policymakers could implement tiered minimum wages – for instance, a higher minimum for hazardous or undesirable shifts. Some states or cities might say, “If you want someone to work in a Class III biohazard lab or in extreme heat, you must pay at least $X above the base minimum.” This is analogous to overtime premiums. During COVID-19, proposals emerged for federally mandated hazard pay +75% of salary for essential workers. Such ideas could be codified for future emergencies or even routine hazards (imagine a law that doubles the minimum wage for any occupation with fatal injury rates above a threshold, or that requires, say, a $5/hour premium for nighttime sanitation work). This would set a floor on compensating differentials, ensuring that no essential dangerous job pays bargain-basement wages. While UBI sets a de facto floor by empowering refusal, a legal floor provides uniformity and signals societal values.
Public Sector Leadership & Essential Service Guarantees: Government is often the provider or funder of last resort for essential 5D services (trash collection, public health, utilities, emergency response). The public sector should lead by example in a UBI world: offer competitive wages and stable jobs for these roles, and if needed, use public funding to fill gaps. For instance, if after UBI a rural county can’t hire volunteer firefighters as before, the state might need to provide funding for a paid fire brigade with attractive salaries. If private nursing homes can’t find staff because they never raised wages, perhaps public options or subsidies tied to wage standards will be necessary. Essentially, don’t let critical systems fail – proactively invest in them. This might mean budgeting for higher pay in all government contracts: e.g. require federal contractors in infrastructure or care work to pay, say, a living wage plus benefits. Governments can also offer bonuses or service scholarships to entice workers into vital fields – for example, forgiving student loans for people who spend 5 years in aged care, or providing a “difficult job” pension credit (retire a bit earlier with full benefits if you did a hazardous career for many years).
Training, Education, and Credentialing Pipelines: As some workers exit 5D jobs and others need to be recruited, training becomes crucial. We will need more skilled workers in certain difficult or dear jobs, and UBI recipients may take the opportunity to get educated for these roles if barriers are lowered. Policy can help by making technical education and apprenticeships free or paid (like a stipend, which UBI already partly provides). For example, if we anticipate a shortage of linemen (electric grid technicians) because not enough people want to climb poles in storms, we could create a program that actively recruits and trains linemen, pays them well during training, and ensures mentorship and safety. Similarly for nursing, trucking (perhaps transitioning to managing autonomous trucks), or other areas. UBI gives people the freedom to pursue training without starving, but additional support (like guaranteed job placements or high-quality training programs) will ease the transitions. It’s also important to break down credential barriers that are arbitrary – maybe many more people would do teaching or plumbing (areas facing shortages) if we expanded training slots and removed unnecessary gatekeeping. Essentially, with UBI we remove the supply of desperate workers, so we must nurture the supply of skilled, willing workers through training incentives.
Embrace and Steer Automation (R&D and Regulation): Public policy should treat automation as an ally to fill 5D gaps. This means investing in R&D for robotics in areas like agriculture (e.g. fruit-picking robots), mining (autonomous drilling), trucking (self-driving tech), cleaning (sewer inspection bots, street-sweeping machines), and caregiving (assistive robots). Government can fund prizes or grants for innovations that remove the need for human drudgery. On the regulation side, we may need updated safety standards for human-robot collaboration, and perhaps social policies for smoothing job transitions. But with UBI, those transitions are less dire. Policymakers should ensure that productivity gains from automation yield broad benefits – potentially by taxing the higher profits and using them to fund UBI or job transition programs. Andrew Yang popularized the idea of a “Robot Tax” to help pay for UBI; while contentious, the underlying concept is aligning the tax system with where value is created when human labor input falls. Even without explicit robot taxes, strong corporate taxes or a value-added tax can capture the economic gains from more automation and feed them into the UBI pool, which then recirculates as spending (supporting jobs in other sectors, like creative work, human-touch services, etc.).
Immigration and Labor Mobility: Although politically sensitive, it’s worth noting that historically the solution to “jobs Americans won’t do” has been immigrant labor. Post-UBI, it may be that some Americans still won’t do certain jobs even at higher wages if those wages don’t rise enough or conditions remain tough. If we truly can’t mechanize some essential dirty job (say, seasonal crop harvesting of delicate fruits) and Americans demand, say, $30/hour to do it but consumers won’t pay that much for berries, one option is to allow in more immigrant workers who find $15 attractive relative to home country options. However, that reintroduces the problem of relying on someone’s desperation – just outsourced. Ethically, UBI’s logic should extend globally (we don’t want to just exploit foreign workers to keep our goods cheap). One approach is international labor agreements that ensure foreign guest workers get similar protections and a path to residency/citizenship (so they aren’t a permanently exploitable underclass). Another is investing in source countries or helping them implement UBI, etc., but that’s a longer game. In the near term, policymakers might use migration as a pressure relief valve in certain sectors, but they should uphold standards (e.g., the H-2A farmworker program could be expanded but also strictly monitored for fair treatment). The better solution is likely investing in automation in agriculture so we aren’t dependent on poverty-wage labor from anywhere.
Public Service Supplements: There are some extreme-risk public service roles (military combat, wildfire fighting, Ebola outbreak nursing) that perhaps warrant additional targeted incentives even beyond UBI and normal wages. Governments already do this (combat pay, student loan forgiveness for doctors in underserved areas, etc.). In a UBI world, those targeted incentives might need to be higher to entice volunteers. For instance, if currently offering a $20k signing bonus gets enough Army recruits, post-UBI maybe it needs to be $30k. That’s fine – it’s a budgeting choice. The key is to view these as supplements, not substitutes. We wouldn’t say “because of UBI we can pay soldiers less” (that would be like subsidizing employers using UBI), rather we might pay more because fewer people feel economic draft pressure. Some have suggested a form of “national service program” could operate alongside UBI – essentially, positive incentives for people to do socially necessary work for a period (with additional pay or educational benefits). This can channel workers into, say, disaster response crews or caregiving corps when needed.
Monitoring and Adjustment: Lastly, policymakers should monitor labor market health after UBI implementation. If certain sectors are consistently understaffed, that’s a signal to adjust policy – maybe increase UBI (if generally wages aren’t rising enough), or enact sector-specific measures like those above, or convene industry to find solutions (e.g. more job redesign). The transition may be bumpy in places – we might see, for example, fast food restaurants struggling to find late-night shift workers initially. The solution might be to raise pay (most likely) or shorten hours or invest in ordering kiosks – all of which is fine. But if an essential public need is in jeopardy, government must step in with interim support (like maybe deploy National Guard for sanitation if absolutely needed while a city raises wages – though one imagines things rarely get that dire if proactive).

To summarize the policy approach: UBI is the floor that stops the race to the bottom; on that floor we build a structure of higher labor standards, smart automation, and public investment to ensure all critical work gets done – by a well-paid, safe, and respected workforce. Society will need to spend more on labor in some areas (food might cost a bit more, taxes might fund higher public worker pay), but those costs are recirculated as incomes and better social outcomes, whereas the current hidden costs of underpaying (injuries, welfare, instability) are far worse.

Counterarguments and Rebuttals

Let’s address some common counterarguments head-on:

“If no one is forced to work, no one will do the dirty work.” This assumes people are fundamentally lazy and will only do unpleasant jobs under duress. The evidence and reasoning we’ve presented refute this. People will do dirty/dangerous jobs for adequate compensation. History shows ample examples: Americans volunteer to be smokejumpers (elite wildfire fighters) because it pays (and attracts risk-seekers); people line up to do crab fishing on the Bering Sea (one of the most dangerous jobs) because a single season can net tens of thousands of dollars; during WWII, factories saw a surge of women join to do “dirty” industrial work not because they were coerced, but because patriotism and decent wages aligned. Moreover, as argued, some portion of the population doesn’t mind certain 5D tasks or even enjoys the challenge – as long as the job is elevated to a dignified, well-compensated profession. Under UBI, the labor supply for 5D jobs will shrink compared to the status quo (fewer people willing at current wages), but it will not disappear. It will reach a new equilibrium where those who truly wouldn’t do it at any reasonable price have the freedom to exit, and those who remain do so because the price became reasonable. And if truly no one on Earth would do a job for any price we can pay, that’s a strong indication that job should not exist in its current form – we should find an alternative (technological or organizational). The direst predictions that “the trash will pile up in the streets forever” underestimate both the willingness of humans to earn more money and the responsiveness of wages. Yes, your trash collector might earn $70,000/year instead of $35,000 – but someone will take that job for that reward, and they’ll do it better and more reliably than a resentful $35k worker forced by poverty.

“This will cause a wage-price spiral and inflation – paying all these workers more will just raise prices for everyone.” It’s true that UBI, especially if not paired with productive capacity, can be inflationary if it simply boosts spending without boosting output. However, in our scenario we are focusing on relative wage adjustments. The price of dirty and dangerous work should go up relative to other things – that’s a one-time shift in relative prices, not runaway inflation. For example, food from a farm that previously relied on exploited migrant labor might become a bit more expensive if that farm has to pay higher wages or invest in a harvester – but that is a rebalancing toward the true cost of ethical production. Inflation is a general increase in prices. UBI is typically financed by taxes or reallocation, so it’s more of a redistribution than pure money printing. Analyses of UBI’s macro effects (e.g., a Roosevelt Institute report modeling a $1,000/month UBI in the U.S.) found little long-term inflation impact, assuming it’s paid for, because while it increases demand, it also can increase productivity and it shifts money from high savers (taxed wealth) to high spenders (low-income households) in a controlled way. In fact, by alleviating poverty, UBI can reduce some distortionary pressures (people relying on debt, etc.). Regardless, some sectors would see higher wages, and thus higher costs: healthcare, food, cleaning services, etc. This is intentional – we want those doing vital work to earn more, and yes, it means those services cost a bit more. But most estimates suggest a minor effect on overall inflation. For instance, one study of a smaller basic income (Alaska’s dividend) found no significant increase in local price levels beyond maybe a seasonal blip. And remember, with automation and improved efficiency offsetting some labor costs, as well as potentially lower turnover (which saves training and hiring costs), businesses can absorb some wage increases without proportional price hikes. Finally, not all sectors will see wage pressure – many “good jobs” might see little change because they already pay above reservation wages. It’s primarily the bottom tier and 5D jobs that adjust. So, yes, some relative prices will rise, but that’s a feature correcting the underpayment of essential labor, not a bug; hyperinflation fears are unfounded if UBI is implemented responsibly (with tax offsets, etc.).

“Taxes will be too high to fund UBI and these higher public wages – it’s unrealistic.” UBI is indeed a significant fiscal undertaking. However, multiple studies show it’s economically feasible for the U.S. with a combination of tax reforms. For example, a $1 trillion per year UBI (roughly $3,000 per citizen) could be funded by measures like a modest VAT (European-style value-added tax), carbon taxes, closing loopholes, wealth taxes, etc. It’s a question of priorities: the U.S. federal budget is about $6 trillion; a lot is spent on healthcare, defense, and pensions. UBI would require re-thinking some welfare programs (some might be replaced by UBI) and raising new revenue, likely in ways that also reduce inequality (taxing the rich who have benefited most from automation and globalization). The net effect on most people’s disposable income would be positive, since UBI gives money even as taxes might go up on the affluent or consumption. Moreover, if UBI helps create a healthier, more educated society (less poverty-related crime, better early-life conditions, etc.), it can reduce costs elsewhere (incarceration, emergency healthcare for the uninsured, etc.). A full financing plan is beyond our scope, but groups from libertarians (who propose a UBI instead of welfare) to progressives (who propose a UBI plus progressive taxation) have sketched pathways. It ultimately is a political question of will – the same was said about Social Security, Medicare, etc., yet societies choose to afford them. UBI at a meaningful level will require broad public buy-in and likely phasing in. But even partial steps (like a smaller guaranteed income or expanded tax credit) can start the process and show results.

In terms of the additional costs we talk about (like higher wages for essential workers, more OSHA inspectors, etc.), those are relatively modest in scale. For example, doubling OSHA’s inspector count might cost a few hundred million dollars – a drop in the bucket. Raising federal contractor wages to a $15 minimum (already done via executive order) actually increased pay for many low-wage workers with minimal cost impact on contracts (because labor is often a fraction of contract cost, and the government can absorb or negotiate). The high hazard pay proposals during COVID (like a $25k bonus for essential workers) would have cost under $200 billion – significant, but again, not unthinkable in a multi-trillion economy, and that was for a pandemic-scale risk. The point is, financing is a matter of priorities and distribution. We have the GDP to do this; it’s about who pays. If anything, UBI funded by taxing top incomes or monopolies could reduce some distortions and make the economy more balanced.

“UBI will just subsidize low-wage employers – they’ll pay even less, knowing workers have UBI.” This is a nuanced point often raised by left critics: if everyone has $1,000 a month “free,” won’t bosses drop wages by $1,000? The outcome depends on bargaining power. UBI gives workers more bargaining power (they can walk away), so employers cannot simply cut pay – they’d lose staff. In fact, as we’ve argued, evidence points to needing to raise pay to attract workers who could otherwise live on UBI plus maybe gig earnings. The scenario where UBI subsidizes low wages would require that workers become willing to accept lower cash wages because of the UBI. But why would they, unless the job is desirable in other ways? Perhaps in very nice jobs people might work for less because they already have income – e.g. someone might take a passion job (artist, research, nonprofit) for low pay because UBI covers the basics. That’s not exploitation; that’s a choice enabled by UBI. In lousy jobs, UBI removes the desperation, so if anything it forces wages up, not down. One could argue that UBI is a subsidy to all employers in that it boosts overall demand (people spending their UBI) and possibly allows for lower wages in some high-end sectors because people value other aspects (someone might become a park ranger for low pay because they love it and have UBI). But those are positive labor reallocations, not exploitative ones. As long as we have a minimum wage and labor standards, companies cannot go below certain levels. UBI sits under workers, not under corporations. In effect, it subsidizes workers’ freedom, which then pushes employers to compete for that now freer labor. So the fear of UBI just becoming a corporate subsidy doesn’t hold in a competitive labor market – unless the UBI is set so low and the labor standards so weak that employers hold all power. Our essay has made clear that in the context of 5D jobs, UBI flips the power toward workers, not employers.

That said, there is one scenario: if UBI is too low to truly empower refusal but enough to count as income, some might feel pressure to accept even lower wages under the table because they don’t “need” as much. But that’s unlikely; people rarely volunteer pay cuts. If anything, employers might try to lure people by saying “hey, you already have UBI, work here for extra cash,” but that’s just normal secondary earners stuff.

“Automation is coming anyway, so why bother with all this? Everyone will be on UBI because there’ll be no jobs.” Automation is indeed advancing, but its timeline is uncertain and uneven across sectors. We will likely have a mix of automated and human labor for many decades, especially in care, creative fields, maintenance, and so on. Even in highly automated scenarios, humans often just move into different roles (monitoring the machines, or doing tasks machines can’t). So yes, eventually many dirty/dangerous jobs will vanish – that’s the goal! – but “while the jobs haven’t been automated yet” (to quote the framing we were asked to answer), we need a solution. That solution is to make those jobs decent via higher pay and safety, or shorten their hours, etc. And simultaneously to accelerate the automation. UBI addresses both: it forces improvements now and encourages substitution of capital for labor where appropriate. It also ensures that when automation happens, people have an income floor. One could say UBI is forward-looking precisely because it anticipates a future with fewer conventional jobs. But rather than wait for mass unemployment to force our hand, implementing UBI earlier empowers workers during the transition, giving them the ability to retrain, relocate, or demand better jobs even before full automation. This smooths the path and avoids a dystopia of “technological unemployment chaos.” In short, automation is not a reason to avoid UBI or avoid improving jobs – it’s a reason to do those things sooner to prepare society for that shift.

At a deeper level, some critics worry that UBI is a distraction from deeper reforms (like job guarantees or empowering unions) or that it will erode the work ethic. The evidence we’ve shown suggests UBI, if anything, can strengthen positive work incentives (by reducing desperation and burnout, people make better long-term choices and can pursue work that suits them). It doesn’t inherently solve every labor problem – we still need the complementary policies – but it is a powerful tool in restructuring how labor markets function. And morally, it affirms that everyone deserves to live, not just those who find a slot in the market. That moral stance actually dignifies work: if work is truly voluntary, then when someone shows up to do a hard job, we know they are choosing to contribute, and we honor that choice with proper compensation and respect. It transforms the social contract around work from, “You have to earn your right to live by taking any job” to “We support everyone’s right to live, and ask people to contribute in the ways they find best – and we value essential contributions more appropriately.”

Conclusion: Dignity, Essential Work, and a New Social Contract – It’s Time to Invest in People

In a Universal Basic Income world, the question, “Who will do the dirty, dangerous work?” has a straightforward answer: the people who are properly rewarded for doing it – and only under conditions that respect their safety and dignity. If that means higher wages, better training, and faster automation, so be it. Those are the real costs of these jobs, and it’s time we stopped hiding those costs by foisting them onto the poor.

The transition envisioned here is not trivial. It requires political courage, public investment, and a shift in mindset. We must start viewing so-called “low” jobs as what they truly are: essential services worthy of high regard and fair pay. UBI helps catalyze this shift by establishing that no one should be at the bottom against their will. It aligns moral value (every person’s life has worth) with economic value (paying people enough to live decently). Far from being a utopian fantasy, the ideas herein draw on extensive empirical evidence and past experience. We know UBI won’t wreck the work ethic; we know fair pay and safety save lives and attract labor; we know technology can relieve humans of drudgery if we deploy it.

For policymakers, the implications are clear: Support UBI legislation and complementary labor reforms. Pilot basic income programs in your city or state (as many have begun doing) and scale up the ones that work. Increase the minimum wage and implement hazard pay bonuses in public contracts – signal to the market that the era of squalid underpay is ending. Fund OSHA, apprenticeship programs, and R&D for automation robustly in the next budget. These are investments in a high-road economy. They may slightly increase the fiscal line item for “labor” but will reduce hidden costs in health, safety nets, and social cohesion. Remember that every major step in labor history – ending child labor, the 8-hour day, the weekend, occupational safety laws – faced the retort “but who will do the work and at what cost?” And every time, we found that a better, safer system emerged that still got the work done, with a more productive and humane economy as a result.

For donors and advocates (like those supporting BasicIncome.org), the task is to continue educating and pushing for this new social contract. That means telling success stories (like Stockton or Alaska or the Cherokee example) to skeptical audiences, funding research and coalition-building, and framing the message: UBI is not a handout to avoid work; it’s a foundation to rebuild the meaning of work. It says we do not blackmail people into contribution; we invite them – and we pay the invitation’s true cost. It resonates with basic American values of freedom and fairness: no one should be forced to take a harmful job because they’re desperate, and if someone does an essential job, they should earn enough to share in the American dream.

Basic income is a bold policy, but as automation accelerates and inequality yawns, it is also an inevitable one. The question is whether we implement it in time to harness its benefits for all or wait until crisis forces our hand. This essay makes the case that now is the time to start, and that in doing so we will uplift those we depend on most – the folks who do the tough jobs – and ultimately create a safer, smarter economy. It aligns economic incentives with moral ones: if we truly value something, we should be willing to pay for it. That includes the dirty work, the dangerous work, the care work. We can no longer allow “essential” to be a synonym for “exploitable.”

UBI is about saying every person’s basic dignity is non-negotiable. From that principle flows the rest: if dignity is non-negotiable, then work must be negotiated on better terms. The 5D jobs question, then, isn’t a strike against UBI – it’s one of the strongest arguments for it. It exposes how much our current system runs on coercion. By removing that, we compel ourselves to truly value those who keep society running.

As we stand on the cusp of this change, we should remember that an economy is a human construct – we can design it differently. We can choose a high-wage, high-safety, high-innovation path. We can ensure that essential jobs are good jobs and that no one is left destitute. Universal Basic Income is the linchpin of that choice.

If you share this vision – of a society that does what’s right for the people at the bottom doing the work we all rely on – then we urge you to join us. Advocate, donate, vote for candidates who support these policies. At BasicallyIncome.org, we are building the movement to make UBI a reality in the U.S. It’s a long fight, but one with historic stakes. Imagine a future where a garbage collector is as respected (and well-compensated) as an engineer, because we recognize both as vital. Imagine dangerous jobs mostly done by machines, and the remaining human roles so well-protected that fatalities become a rarity. Imagine workers able to walk away from abuse, making every workplace better by their empowerment.

That future is possible – but we have to choose it. As a closing call: Help us elevate basic income from idea to policy. Help us ensure that if we need it done, we pay what it costs in human terms. It’s time to end the coercion, honor the contribution, and invest in the freedom and dignity of all.

Donate to Basically Income and allied campaigns today, and together let’s build an economy where essential work is respected, and where no one is compelled to sacrifice life or limb just to make a living.

(No one should have to be a martyr for a paycheck. With UBI, we can end that era – and greet one where essential labor is truly valued, in word and in deed.)

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